In the ultimatum game, two players are asked to split a certain sum of money. The proposer has to make an o¡er. If the responder accepts the o¡er, the money will be shared accordingly. If the responder rejects the o¡er, both players receive nothing. The rational solution is for the proposer to o¡er the smallest possible share, and for the responder to accept it. Human players, in contrast, usually prefer fair splits. In this paper, we use evolutionary game theory to analyse the ultimatum game. We ¢rst show that in a nonspatial setting, natural selection chooses the unfair, rational solution. In a spatial setting, however, much fairer outcomes evolve.
INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction by Gu« th et al. (1982) , the ultimatum game has fascinated game theorists and experimental economists. The rules can be stated in a couple of lines. Two players are o¡ered a gift, provided they manage to share it. One of the playersöthe proposerösuggests how to split the o¡er, the other playeröthe responderöcan either agree or else reject the deal. In each case the decision is ¢nal.
A rational responder bent on maximizing his utility should accept even the smallest positive o¡er, because the alternative is getting nothing. A rational proposer who believes that his opponent is rational should therefore claim almost the entire sum. But it was found in a large number of experiments, in many countries and for varied stakes, that this is not how humans play the game. Most proposers o¡er a fair shareöin fact, some 60^80% of proposers o¡er fractions between 0:4 and 0:5, and only 3% o¡er less than 0:2. They are well advised to do thisö indeed, some 50% of responders reject any split o¡ering them less than one-third of the sum (for surveys see Thaler 1988; Gu« th & Tietze 1990; Roth et al. 1991; Bolton & Zwick 1995; Roth 1995) .
There are many explanations for this uneconomical emphasis on a fair division; this seems to re£ect the psychological fact that humans use a utility function which does not simply correspond to the expected payo¡, but is also a decreasing function of the di¡erence between the pay-o¡ values of the two players engaged in the game (Kirchsteiger 1994; Bethwaite & Tompkinson 1996; Fehr & Schmidt 1999) . In particular, the rejection of a low o¡er by the responder can be seen as a kind of punishment in£icted by the responder on the proposer (who loses much more than the responder, in that case). Many theoretical and experimental investigations (see Boyd & Richerson (1992) , for instance, or Fehr & Ga« chter (1999) ) have stressed the important role of punishment for inhibiting sel¢sh individuals.
A frequently used explanation for the human behaviour in the ultimatum game is that the players do not realize that they interact only once. They are expecting repeated interactions, even if the experimenter makes it clear that there will be no repetition. The game can be repeated in di¡erent ways. A ¢xed proposer and responder may simply play a number of times and sum their pay-o¡s from each game. This may lead to an incentive for the responder to reject low o¡ers to obtain more in subsequent rounds. Alternatively, players may play a repeated ultimatum game in which they take turns in the role of proposer and have to divide a single sum. The game can continue until they reach agreement. This is equivalent to haggling over a price. If it is assumed that the sum is discounted from round to round (`the shrinking pie'), one obtains a very convincing model of bargaining (Rubinstein 1982; Binmore 1992) .
The tacit expectation of a further round is certainly as plausible to explain fairness in the ultimatum game, as to explain cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. However, it has been shown that a spatial population structure changes the outcome of the one-round prisoner's dilemma to a considerable extent (Nowak & May 1992; Nowak et al. 1994) . In this paper, we investigate similar e¡ects of a spatial structure on the ultimatum game. Again, neighbourhood relations and structured interactions a¡ect the evolution of the strategiesöin particular, fair shares become a likely outcome.
This approach is related to Huck & O « chssler (1999) , where it is shownöin a non-spatial contextöthat ultimatum games played in small groups can lead to positive o¡ers. Small groups localize the competition. For reproductive success, the possibility that the co-player gets a relative advantage might become more important than the size of the player's own pay-o¡. This e¡ect, however, can only lead to o¡ers which are less than the reciprocal of the group size. In our spatial set-up, we get considerably higher o¡ers.
In a biological context, the ultimatum game could perhaps describe two individuals trying to divide in advance the reward of a task that they can only perform jointly, such as cooperative hunting or forming an alliance against another group member. If one individual is dominant, then it is possible that that individual would determine the split and that the other individual would simply have to take it or leave it. The ultimatum game could also re£ect dilemmas of food sharing: if the players do not agree on a split, there is a possibility that someone will take away the food or the food will disappear (for example, in cases of stream feeding of ¢sh; M. Milinski, personal communication). Hence, while the experimental situation of an isolated, anonymous ultimatum game is somewhat arti¢cial, it is very likely that situations similar to it have shaped the fairness instinct of animals and humans for millions of years.
In addition, experiments on the ultimatum game shed a striking light on our mental equipment for social and economic life. Why do fairness considerations matter more, to many of us, than rational utility maximization?
RANDOM ENCOUNTERS
We normalize the sum which is to be divided by the two players to be equal to unity, and consider strategies given by two parameters p and q in the unit interval. The parameter p denotes the amount o¡ered to the other player if one is in the role of the proposer, while q denotes the minimum acceptance level (or aspiration level) when one is the responder.
Let us suppose that in an interaction between a player using strategy S 1ˆ( p 1 , q 1 ) and a player using strategy S 2ˆ( p 2 , q 2 ), each player can be in the role of proposer with equal probability. The expected value of the pay-o¡ for the S 1 player against the S 2 player, E(S 1 , S 2 ), is given (up to the factor 1 2 , which we henceforth omit) by 
Consider the following evolutionary dynamics. There is a population of N players. In each round (generation), every player interacts with every other player. The payo¡s are added up. For the next generation, players leave o¡spring in numbers proportional to their ¢tness.
O¡spring inherit (or learn) their parent's strategy subject to some small mutation: their p-and q-values are randomly chosen within an interval of size e centred around their parent's p-and q-values.
In simulations of a population of Nˆ100 players, we calculated the time averages of the mean p-and q-values, · p and · q respectively, and the average values (over time) of the standard deviations of p and q within the population. These are shown in table 1, for various values of e. For very small e, the · p-and · q-values tend to zero. Thus accurate reproduction (or imitation) of strategies favours the rational outcome. For larger values of e, however, we observe signi¢cant positive o¡ers and aspiration levels. For example, eˆ0:1 leads to · p º 0:27 and · q º 0:10. It should be noted that this e¡ect is not simply a consequence of mutational noise, but involves selection at least on the value of · p. In ½ 2(a), we show that heterogeneity in the population favours non-zero o¡ers. In this context, we also refer to the paper by Gale et al. (1995) where the important role of errors is analysed in the context of mini-games (games with only two levels of o¡er and demand). Figure 1 shows the time evolution of · p and · q in a simulation of a population of 100 individuals, who initially have randomly assigned p-and q-values.The mutation error, e, is 0:1. For small mutation errors, evolution leads to a population of near rational players.
(a) What is the best response to a random strategy?
We have seen in ½ 2 that a small error in imitating a parent's strategy can lead to a diversity of strategies within the population. This leads to a pressure to o¡er a non-zero amount. Perhaps it is smart to have a strategy which, instead of being the optimal response to another rational player, fares well against a population in which there is some diversity. As an illustration that these are not the same in the ultimatum game, we consider the best Table 1 . Evolution in the non-spatial ultimatum game leads to a population of near`rational' players (The table shows the mean o¡er and acceptance level and also the standard deviations (spread within the population) in a population of 100 individuals, for simulations with various mutation errors, e. Initially all individuals have randomly distributed o¡ers and acceptance rates. Everyone plays everyone else and the number of o¡spring of a given individual is proportional to his total pay-o¡. The values given are averages over time, sampled at 10 4 generation intervals between 10 5 generations and 10 6 generations. The outcome approaches rational behaviour as e becomes in¢nitesimally small. For larger e, the heterogeneity of the population favours non-zero acceptance rates which in turn favour non-zero o¡ers.) Figure 1. This ¢gure shows the time evolution of the average o¡er (a) and acceptance levels (b) in simulations of the nonspatial ultimatum game. Initially the 100 individuals in the population have random o¡ers and acceptance levels. Everyone plays everyone else (both as proposer and responder) and the number of o¡spring of a given individual is proportional to his total pay-o¡. The mutation error, e, is 0.1. The time-scale is logarithmic to illustrate the long term (albeit noisy) convergence.
response to a population the strategies of which are randomly distributed. We note that the rational solution does not maximize the expected pay-o¡ in a population of players whose (p, q)-strategies are randomly distributed in the unit square. This can be shown as follows.
If we assume that the p-and q-values are uniformly distributed between zero and unity, we see immediately that the strategy Sˆ( 1 2 , 0) does best. The average payo¡, P, of a strategy Sˆ(p, q) against opponents in the square is given by
where I [ . . .] is the indicator function, taking value unity if its argument is true and zero if it is false. The average pay-o¡, P, is thus maximized by (p, q)ˆ( 1 2 , 0). Thus, the best response to the rational strategy is (0, 0) itself, and the best response to a random strategy is ( 1 2 , 0).
THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL SPATIAL ULTIMATUM GAME
So far we have assumed that players meet randomly. If there is any social structure ödue, for instance, simply to a spatial arrangementöthe outcome can be very di¡erent. Because encounters are no longer randomized, the success of a strategy S 2 invading a population using strategy S 1 depends not only on the pay-o¡s E(S 1 , S 1 ) and E(S 2 , S 1 ), i.e. on encounters with the vast majority, but also on E(S 1 , S 2 ) and E(S 2 , S 2 ). The invading minority can a¡ect locally the resident's pay-o¡. Beating one's neighbours is now all important.
Let us consider players located on a one-dimensional lattice, each interacting with his two nearest neighbours. Players also compete only with their nearest neighbours for o¡spring. We once again assume that o¡spring are apportioned probabilistically in proportion to the total scores of the parents. The probability that the o¡spring at a speci¢c site belongs to a given member of the neighbourhood of that site is equal to that player's score divided by the total score of the three players in the neighbourhood. For a more general discussion of the formulation of spatial games, see Killingback & Doebeli (1998) .
Consider the strategies S 1 and S 2 with q 1 4p 1 5 q 2 4p 2 . We know that in the non-spatial game there is a bistable equilibrium between these two strategies, because each strategy is the better response against itself. Hence a small proportion of S 2 -strategists cannot invade a population of S 1 -strategists. Suppose, however, that there is a single S 2 -strategist (`mutant') isolated in a sea of S 1 -strategists (`residents'). With the exception of the players at the frontiers, all have pay-o¡ 2 (with one provided from each neighbour). At the frontier, the S 2 -strategist will obtain 2(1 ¡ p 2 ), whereas its S 1 -neighbours obtain 1 ‡ p 2 each (see ¢gure 2a). Hence the probability of each of the neighbours of the mutant to become ousted by the mutant in the next generation is 2(1 ¡ p 2 )=‰2(1 ¡ p 2 ) ‡ (1 ‡ p 2 ) ‡ 2Šˆ2(1 ¡ p 2 )=(5 ¡ p 2 ) and the probability of the mutant to become ousted by the resident-type in the next generation is 2(1 ‡ p 2 )=‰2(1 ‡ p 2 ) ‡ 2(1 ¡ p 2 )Šˆ(1 ‡ p 2 )=2. Thus the expected number of o¡spring of the mutant exceeds unity if 2 £ 2(1 ¡ p 2 )=(5 ¡ p 2 )5(1 ‡ p 2 )=2, i.e. if p < 0:26 . . .. For an adjacent pair of S 2 -players, the critical condition is p 2 < 0:43 . . . (see ¢gure 2b).
When there is a small cluster of at least three S 2 -strategists (see ¢gure 2c), all players, except those at the frontier, have pay-o¡ 2. The S 1 -player at each frontier obtains 1 ‡ p 2 , the S 2 -player next to it obtains 2 ¡ p 2 . Hence the probability that a site at the boundary switches from resident to . We performed numerical simulations of the spatial ultimatum game with two total population sizes (Nˆ100, 500) and various neighbourhood sizes (nˆ2, 6, 10). The neighbourhood size is the number of individuals who play the game with a given individual. The individual at a given site competes with its n`neighbours' to give rise to the o¡spring at that site. The resulting average o¡ers and acceptance levels together with their standard deviations are shown in table 2. With increasing N and decreasing n, evolution leads to players o¡ering and demanding an almost fair split. Note that the results of these simulations were not signi¢cantly a¡ected by whether each pair of neighbours played the game only once with the role of proposer assigned randomly or whether they played twice, each taking the role of proposer once. In the above analysis we have assumed the latter for simplicity. Figure 3 shows the evolutionary dynamics of the system starting from a random initial condition. Initially, when the o¡ers within these clusters are di¡erent from the acceptance levels, natural selection favours the domination of a cluster with o¡er and acceptance level close together. Of course, the o¡er always exceeds the acceptance level. Clustering then develops on a more microscopic scale and the system is slowly driven towards fairness.
THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPATIAL ULTIMATUM GAME
We now consider players arranged on a two-dimensional square lattice. Each player interacts with his neighbours directly above, below, to the left and to the right. This is called a von Neumann neighbourhood. Unlike the onedimensional case, there are are many con¢gurations of mutant cluster that we could consider. However, it appears that the reproductive success of a 3 £ 3 square mutant cluster is critical to the ability of the mutant to invade (Killingback et al. 1999 ). If we consider, once again, a resident strategy, S 1 , and a mutant strategy, S 2 , with q 1 4p 1 5 q 2 4p 2 , then we ¢nd that a 3 £ 3 mutant cluster of the fairer type is likely to expand if and only if
The results of numerical simulations of the ultimatum game on square lattices of various sizes are shown in table 3. As the grid size becomes large, the average o¡er and acceptance rate in the population comes close to the value of p for which the 3 £ 3 mutant cluster spreads. Thus also in the two-dimensional situation, evolution leads to strategies which show some degree of fairness.
SUMMARY
A straightforward evolutionary approach to the ultimatum game in which all members of the population play each other with equal probabilities and their o¡spring are apportioned according to their total scores, predicts that the average o¡er and acceptance rate in the population will tend to some values near zero, provided that the mutation error is very small. Thus players ultimately display behaviour which is close to the`rational' behaviour predicted by game theory and unlike observed human behaviour. Larger mutation errors lead to a heterogeneous population with consequently larger average o¡er and acceptance rate. For example, a large mutation error of 0:1 leads to an average o¡er of around 0:27. The aspiration levels, q, in simulations of the nonspatial ultimatum game are, however, considerably smaller than those found experimentally.
If players compete for o¡spring only with certain neighbours rather than with all of the population, then it is their score relative to those neighbours which is important. Thus there is more pressure not to allow an opponent to get away with an unfairly large share of the pie. In a one-dimensional geometry with nearest neighbour interactions, we ¢nd that the average o¡er and acceptance level approximate a fair split. When the players are arranged on a two-dimensional square lattice, we obtain o¡ers around 0:35.
Clearly, just as with the prisoner's dilemma or the hawk^dove game (see Nowak & May 1992; Nowak et al. 1994; Killingback & Doebeli 1998) , spatial population structure can have important e¡ects on the evolutionary outcome of the ultimatum game. In another paper (Nowak et al. 2000) , we show that some information on the co-player's past actions can lead to the prevalence of fair splits. Experience shows that the fate of a random arrangement of two strategies on a grid depends essentially on whether a 3 £ 3 cluster of one strategy can spread or not (Killingback et al. 1999) . Thus let us assume that all members of the population play strategy S 1ˆ( p 1 , q 1 ), except for a 3 £ 3 cluster of mutants who play the strategy S 2ˆ( p 2 , q 2 ), with p 2 5 q 2 5p 1 5 q 1 (the most interesting case). Let us consider a von Neumann neighbourhood: ¢gure A1 shows the mutant players represented by black squares and the resident players represented by white squares. If the sum of the expected number of the nine mutants' o¡spring exceeds nine, then we expect the mutant cluster to spread. The expected number of o¡spring of a player is equal to the sum (over each site of the neighbourhood) of the probabilities that the player gives rise to o¡spring at that site. This probablity is determined by the player's total pay-o¡ divided by the total pay-o¡ of all players in the neighbourhood of that site. The ¢gure shows the payo¡s attained by players within the mutant cluster and just outside the boundary. The rest of the resident players further away from the mutant cluster all receive a total pay-o¡ of four.
We can deduce that mutant players at a corner of the square have expected number of o¡spring given by Figure A1 . This ¢gure shows (in black) a 3 £ 3 cluster of players playing the mutant strategy, S2, in a large square of players playing the host strategy, S 1 , in white. The o¡ers and acceptance rates of these strategies satisfy p25 q2 > p15 q1. The pay-o¡ obtained by each player is indicated on the ¢gure, with unlabelled squares having the same pay-o¡s as their counterparts under 908 rotation.
